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Abstract:  We present evidence from a pre-registered experiment indicating that a philosophical 
argument––a type of rational appeal––can persuade people to make charitable donations.  The 
rational appeal we used follows Singer’s well-known “shallow pond” argument (1972), while 
incorporating an evolutionary debunking argument (Paxton, Ungar, & Greene 2012) against 
favoring nearby victims over distant ones.  The effectiveness of this rational appeal did not differ 
significantly from that of a well-tested emotional appeal involving an image of a single child in 
need (Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic 2007).  This is a surprising result, given evidence that 
emotions are the primary drivers of moral action, a view that has been very influential in the 
work of development organizations.  We did not find support for our pre-registered hypothesis 
that combining our rational and emotional appeals would have a significantly stronger effect than 
either appeal in isolation.  However, our finding that both kinds of appeal can increase charitable 
donations is cause for optimism, especially concerning the potential efficacy of well-designed 
rational appeals.  We consider the significance of these findings for moral psychology, ethics, 
and the work of organizations aiming to alleviate severe poverty. 
  
Keywords: charitable donation, emotional appeals, philosophical arguments, moral motivation, 
rational appeals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* For helpful comments, the authors would like to thank Ana Gantman, Serene Khader, the editor 
Andreas Glöckner, and an anonymous reviewer for the journal.  We would also like to thank 
Oxfam Australia and Oxfam America for providing us with images to use in our studies.  This 
research was supported by a grant from the University Center for Human Values, Princeton 
University.  Paul Slovic wishes to acknowledge support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and 
the US National Science Foundation under Grant 1227729.  Any opinions, findings, and 
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. 
  2 
Introduction 
 
The total cost of preventing someone from dying of malaria has been reported as being 
about $3,340 USD (Hillebrandt 2015).  While progress has been made, malaria and other 
diseases that we already have the tools to address are still responsible for millions of deaths each 
year and disproportionately kill young children.  NGOs like the Against Malaria Foundation, the 
Schistosomiasis Control Initiative, and GiveDirectly have been demonstrated to be very effective 
in using donations to save lives and produce other positive health outcomes for some of the 
poorest people in the world.  But what does it take to convince ordinary people to devote some of 
their resources to these worthy causes? 
In this paper we present a novel study that shows that, in addition to emotional appeals, which 
have already been demonstrated to promote charitable giving, a rational appeal in the form of a 
philosophical argument can also do so.  Indeed, the rational appeal that we developed based on 
Peter Singer’s well-known “shallow pond” argument (Singer 1972) produced an effect on 
charitable giving behavior similar to a type of powerful emotional appeal, involving the photo of 
a single child in need.  The relative success of emotional appeals has been taken by many to 
show that rationality has little place in motivating prosocial behavior.  While we didn’t find 
evidence for our hypothesis that a combined rational-and-emotional appeal would perform best, 
or that one particular combined ordering would be better than the other, our hypothesis that an 
ethical argument can have a significant effect on donations was supported.  Further, there wasn’t 
a significant difference between the effect of the argument and the single-child-style emotional 
appeal.  We describe these findings and reflect on their implications for moral psychology, 
ethics, and the practical task of motivating charitable giving.    
 
1. Emotional and Rational Appeals 
 
 As suggested above, the view that emotions are the primary––if not exclusive––drivers of 
moral decision-making is highly influential in moral psychology (Haidt 2001, 2012).  In the 
domain of charitable giving, some attempts to provide rationally relevant information to 
decision-makers have been ineffective, and even counterproductive.  Small, Loewenstein, and 
Slovic (2007) found that appeals that include a photo of a single girl named Rokia living in 
poverty in Mali were more effective in garnering charitable donations than appeals that provided 
information about the number of people in need of assistance.  Donations to this single victim of 
poverty were considerably higher than donations to “statistical” victims, in line with the 
“identifiable-victim effect” (Genevsky et al., 2013, Schelling 1968; Jenni and Loewenstein 1997; 
Small and Loewenstein 2003).  Most notably, adding statistical information to an appeal 
featuring a single identifiable person in need reduced the amount donated (Small, Loewenstein, 
and Slovic 2007).  Slovic (2007) has presented further evidence in support of this view and 
argued that the phenomenon of “psychic numbing” (Lifton 1967) explains the turning off of 
feeling as participants move from considering one individual to considering two or more.  More 
generally, other research indicates that pro-social behavior is primarily intuitive and often 
inhibited by reasoning and reflection (Rand, Greene, & Nowak 2012; Rand et al. 2014; Rand 
2016; Everett et al. 2017).  These findings do not show that all attempts to encourage charitable 
giving through rational persuasion are doomed, but they illustrate the formidability of the 
challenge. 
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 On the other hand, the rise of the Effective Altruism movement, which was inspired by 
the work of Peter Singer (e.g., Singer 1972, 2015), strongly suggests that many people have been 
convinced to donate their money to aid the world’s neediest people through rational 
argumentation. Philosophical arguments are rational appeals, and it is striking that these 
arguments generally have not had their effects tested empirically.  One of the few examples of an 
argument being tested comes from a study in which researchers attempted to persuade 
participants using an evolutionary debunking argument (Paxton, Ungar, & Greene 2012).  There 
is also evidence that a tendency toward reflection and actively open-minded thinking can 
influence moral judgment (Baron et al. 2015; Paxton, Ungar, & Greene 2012; Paxton, Bruni, & 
Greene 2013).  But the efficacy of philosophical arguments remains, on the whole, unknown. 
 
2. Motivation for the Study 
 
 Putting these two perspectives together, in this paper we examine how a rational appeal 
of the type put forward by Singer fares against the type of prominent image-based emotional 
appeal used by Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic (2007).  The dominant view’s pessimism about 
the role of rationality in moral motivation can only be defensible if the efficacy of the best 
rational appeals is tested empirically.  Given the track record of philosophical arguments in 
inspiring movements like the Effective Altruism movement and the Animal Rights movement 
(Jasper and Nelkin 1992), we maintain cautious optimism concerning the potential for reasoned 
persuasion in this domain.   
In a pilot study we found that a rational appeal can perform just as well in motivating 
people to help those living in severe poverty as a photo-of-a-child style appeal.  We also 
observed in the pilot that a combined appeal, presenting the one-child emotional appeal and then 
providing the rational appeal, was even more effective.  The theoretical basis for testing the 
combined appeal was that a strong basic motivation would be activated by the emotional appeal, 
whereas the rational appeal will provide a justification that further increases motivation. 
 In this study, we aimed to investigate whether these preliminary findings hold in a pre-
registered study.  We hypothesized that (1) the rational appeal that we have developed would 
have a significant effect in increasing donations, (2) the emotional appeal would also have a 
significant positive effect, and (3) that a combined appeal involving both the emotional and 
rational appeals, in that order, would be more effective in increasing donations than either appeal 
on its own.  
 In addition to examining the efficacy of a combined emotional-rational appeal, our study 
asked whether the effect of a combined appeal depends on the ordering of its components.  A 
fourth hypothesis of ours, although we were less confident of it, was that (4) presenting the 
emotional appeal first and the rational appeal second would perform better in garnering 
donations than the reverse order.  Our reason for making this prediction about the emotional-
rational ordering was that presenting the emotional appeal first would put people in the mode of 
thinking and caring about actual people living in severe poverty.  The rational appeal that 
followed would then provide a strong justification for taking these thoughts and emotions 
seriously and donating, and this would have additional motivational force.  Conversely, starting 
with a rational appeal, we thought, might not provide the same initial grip on participants (even 
if, as hypotheses (1) and (2) predict, the rational and emotional appeals would both have 
significant positive effects when presented on their own).  This predicted order effect was 
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secondary to our three main hypotheses, but was still of interest in seeking a better understanding 
of the relationship between rationality and emotion in motivating charitable giving. 
To summarize, our hypotheses were: 
(1) that the rational appeal will have a significant positive effect in garnering donations 
compared to no appeal. 
(2) that the emotional appeal will also have a significant effect compared to no appeal. 
(3) that a combined appeal consisting of the emotional appeal first and the rational appeal 
second will result in greater mean donations than either appeal alone. (4) that presenting the emotional appeal first and the rational appeal second will result in 
greater mean donations than the reverse order.	
We did not hypothesize that the effects of the rational appeal and the emotional appeal 
would differ significantly in mean donations given.  However, given that the content of these two 
appeals is very different, they could differ in other ways (e.g. personal emotional reaction, rate of 
donation).  
To test these hypotheses, we designed a between-participants study.  Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the four appeal conditions (emotional, rational, combined-
emotional-first, combined-rational-first) or the control condition involving no appeal.  They were 
then told at the beginning of the survey that they would be paid $1.50 for their participation, but 
would also be entered in a drawing for a chance of winning an additional $100.  After reading 
the appeal to which they were assigned, or as the first step if they were assigned to the control 
condition, they had the opportunity to commit to donating some portion of the $100 they might 
win.  It was explained that their donation, if given, would go to an organization that works 
effectively to address the poverty-related problems of children in developing countries, more 
specifically, one of the top organizations working on global poverty as rated by GiveWell.  They 
were given the GiveWell website address (www.givewell.org), and it was explained that 
GiveWell is an independent organization that carries out research to find the organizations that 
do the most good per dollar received according to a number of strict, testable criteria.  They were 
then asked to write in some number between 0 and 100 to indicate how much of the $100 they 
wanted to donate if they won.  This contingent donation method has been used in other studies 
examining donation behavior (e.g., Soyer, E., and Hogarth, R., 2011) and allowed us to examine 
decisions with significant real-world effects while keeping the cost of our study manageable. 
Data quality was assessed by two factors: survey completion time and a 3-item, multiple 
choice attention check section administered at the end of the survey.  These questions sought 
information that was obvious in the scenario (e.g. “What was the name of the girl that was 
helped by the charity?”).  Participants answering fewer than 2 of these questions correctly were 
removed from the analysis.  Participants with completion times more than 2 standard deviations 
below the mean were removed. 
 Because we used specific rational and emotional appeals, we were aware that we would 
not be able to draw conclusions about other rational and emotional appeals, nor about such 
appeals in general.  Of course, the number of possible rational and emotional appeals is 
enormous––effectively infinite––and we don’t think that there is a way to test a truly 
representative sample of all these possibilities.  Nor was this our goal.  We chose the specific 
appeals that we did based on prior research and theory.  The emotional appeal was modeled on 
the Rokia studies described above, which have been highly influential both in moral psychology 
and in the work of international organizations, including UNHCR.  We chose the specific 
rational appeal that we developed because it is modeled on the apparently successful appeal 
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made by Peter Singer in his classic article “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” (Singer 1972), 
which is cited as a core motivating essay by Effective Altruists and has been reiterated by many 
others.  Thus, we tested a specific strategy that had some theoretical and historical motivation 
behind it.  And while our work is not directly applied, we hope that it might pave the way for 
more directly applied research. 
 
3. Study on rational and emotional appeal 
 
Note: The experimental methods and analyses described below (unless otherwise noted) follow 
our pre-registered analysis plan, as described at https://osf.io/bdnz2. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Participants were 1,260 American adults recruited through Prolific, paid $1.50 to 
participate in a short online survey.  To increase the representativeness of the data for the US 
population, Prolific’s “Representative Sampling” service was employed, using quota based 
sampling with criteria for age, gender, and ethnicity.  Participants who passed data quality 
checks were included in further analysis (N = 975).  The resulting sample analyzed was 53.7% 
female (45.3% male, 0.9% other) with a mean age of 44.82 (SD = 15.86).  Allowing multiple 
racial identity selection, 77.2% of participants identified as white, 13.4% black, 7.5% Asian, 
4.3% Latino, 1.2% Native American, and 1.0% other.  In terms of socioeconomic status, 54.1% 
possessed a bachelor’s degree or higher and median household income was $40,000-$49,999.  
Political orientation was assessed separately for social and economic issues; 65.2% identified as 
at least slightly liberal in social issues (14.5% moderate, 20.4% conservative); 54.2% identified 
as at least slightly liberal in economic issues (17.3% moderate, 28.5% conservative). In terms of 
reported monetary donation frequency, 14.7% were regular donors, 25.3% periodic donors, 
29.4% donated on occasion, 25% donated very rarely, and 5.5% reported never donating.  
 
Materials and design 
 
 The appeals from our pilot studies were presented at the beginning of the survey (See 
Appendix A).  In the case of the combined appeal conditions, either the rational or the emotional 
appeal appeared first and a bridging statement was used between them (“Now please also read 
the following appeal”).  In the appeal conditions (emotional, rational, combined-emotional-first, 
combined-rational-first), participants read the appeal(s) assigned to them and then the donation 
prompt.  In the control condition (no appeal), participants went straight to the donation prompt.  
The donation prompt asked participants what amount of the additional $100 that they might win, 
from $0 to the full amount, they would like to donate to one of the top organizations working on 
global poverty as rated by GiveWell.  After the donation prompt, participants completed 
affective measures including ratings of upset (“I feel upset”), sympathy (“I feel sympathy for 
children in severe poverty”), closeness (“I feel close to children in severe poverty”), moral 
responsibility (“I have a moral responsibility to help children in severe poverty”), and efficacy 
(“I can make a difference in helping children in severe poverty”).  Next, participants responded 
to an open-ended prompt to describe their thoughts during reading of the appeal.  Finally, 
  6 
participants completed an individual difference measure of affect responses (Emotional 
Reactivity Test) and a demographic information form. 
 
Results 
 
Table 1. Donation descriptive statistics by appeal condition 
Appeal 
Condition 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std. Error 
% 
Donated 
Rational  197 41.83 50.00 2.35 83.8 
Emotional 200 45.51 50.00 2.40 86.5 
R-> E 187 47.40 50.00 2.61 83.4 
E-> R 195 43.94 50.00 2.46 86.7 
Control 196 35.66 25.00 2.34 80.6 
Total 975 42.83 50.00 1.09 84.2 
 
Descriptive statistics for donation amounts, split by appeal condition, are shown in Table 
1.  All appeal conditions resulted in higher mean donations than the control condition with no 
appeal (M = 35.66, SD = 32.78).  The donation frequencies were trimodal, with peaks at $0, $50, 
and $100. A plot of the fitted residuals and Q-Q plot  revealed a non-normal distribution of error 
values, although a Levene’s test did not indicate heterogeneity of variances (F(4, 970)=0.57, 
p=.69). To account for these issues, non-parametric tests were added to supplement traditional 
least-squares tests. The percentage of participants who donated varied little across the conditions 
with 80.6-86.7% choosing to donate at least some amount.  
 
Table 2. Affective measures means (S.E.) by appeal condition  
Appeal Condition Upset Sympathy Closeness 
Moral 
Resp. Efficacy 
Rational 1.76 (0.07) 
4.07 
(0.06) 
2.75 
(0.08) 
3.34 
(0.08) 
3.23 
(0.08) 
Emotional 1.7 (0.07) 
3.95 
(0.07) 
2.54 
(0.08) 
3.15 
(0.08) 
3.05 
(0.08) 
R-> E 1.78 (0.07) 
4.11 
(0.06) 
2.68 
(0.08) 
3.2 
(0.08) 
3.23 
(0.09) 
E-> R 1.88 (0.08) 
4.19 
(0.06) 
2.62 
(0.09) 
3.33 
(0.08) 
3.3 
(0.08) 
Control 1.46 (0.06) 
4.09 
(0.07) 
2.62 
(0.09) 
3.28 
(0.08) 
3.11 
(0.08) 
Total 1.71 (0.03) 
4.08 
(0.03) 
2.64 
(0.04) 
3.26 
(0.04) 
3.18 
(0.04) 
 
For affective and reaction measures, the appeal conditions differed little in terms of 
reported degrees of being upset following reading the appeal, but were noticeably higher than the 
control condition, t(973) = 4.19, p < .001).  Reported sympathy (F(4, 970) = 2.03, p = .09), 
closeness (F(4, 970) = 0.90, p = .47), moral responsibility (F(4, 970) = 1.07, p = .37), and 
perceived efficacy (F(4, 970) = 1.63, p = .17) did not differ significantly across the conditions.  
 Table 3 presents the Pearson-correlation matrix for donation behaviors, affective and 
reaction measures, and demographic variables.  Notable findings concerning donation decisions 
are as follows: The decision to donate significantly correlated with the rated upset following the 
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appeal (r = .12, p < .001), sympathy for children in severe poverty (r = .24, p < .001), closeness 
(r = .18, p < .001), moral responsibility (r = .34, p < .001), and perceived efficacy (r = .32, p < 
.001), as well as economic political orientation (r = -.11, p = .001) and reported frequency of 
donations in general (r = .14, p = .001).  Donation amount was also significantly correlated with 
the rated upset following the appeal (r = .16, p < .001), sympathy for children in severe poverty 
(r = .28, p < .001), closeness (r = .20, p < .001), moral responsibility (r = .40, p < .001), and 
perceived efficacy (r = .36, p < .001), as well age (r = -.13, p = .001) and reported frequency of 
donations in general (r = .14, p = .001).  Donation amount was also related to social and 
economic political orientations (r = -.09, p = .006; r = -.09, p=.005, respectively), with liberals 
donating more than conservatives.  Not surprisingly, participants who donated more frequently in 
general donated higher amounts in this context (r = .23, p < .001). 
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Table 3. Pearson Correlations (N = 975) 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
1. Donated  
(No=0, Yes=1) 
             
2. Donation amount .544**             
3. Upset .123** .155**            
4. Sympathy .244** .283** .182**           
5. Closeness .179** .204** .186** .506**          
6. Moral Resp. .339** .395** .207** .567** .537**         
7. Efficacy .323** .357** .152** .443** .456** .617**        
8. Age 0.035 .126** -.076* 0.050 -0.023 0.021 -0.025       
9. Gender  
(1=male, 2=female) 0.031 -0.015 0.055 .133
** -0.012 .097** 0.005 0.033      
10. Political 
Orientation (Social; 
lower= more liberal) 
-0.061 -.088** -.128** -.114** -.098** -.165** -.077* .194** -.099**     
11. Political 
Orientation 
(Economic; lower= 
more liberal) 
-.105** -.079* -.149** -.122** -.124** -.199** -.076* .193** -.134** .802**    
12. Income 0.019 .091** -0.031 0.013 -.085** 0.051 0.059 0.025 -.066* 0.042 .097**   
13. Education -0.001 0.038 -.064* -0.060 -.065* -0.008 0.011 .159** -0.009 -.109** -0.039 .326**  
14. Donation 
frequency .141
** .230** -0.024 .234** .192** .331** .282** .310** 0.052 .080* .100** .297** .210** 
Note. ** = p < .01, * = p < .05  
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Donation amounts were analyzed using regression with planned orthogonal 
contrast codes to compare the appeal conditions (See Figure 1).  Due to the non-normal 
distribution of the residuals, Mann-Whitney U tests supplemented linear contrasts to 
assess for differences in donation distributions between conditions. Significance is 
reported using one-tailed tests.  The rational appeal significantly increased donations over 
the control condition (std. b = -.057, p = .036, 95% CI = [-6.45, .28], Mann-Whitney U p 
= .023.  The emotional appeal also increased donations significantly over the control 
condition, std. b = -.092, p = .002, 95% CI = [-8.27, -1.57] Mann-Whitney U p = .001.  
When the appeals were combined (emotional appeal, then rational), it increased the 
donation amount similar to the single appeals, not differing significantly from the rational 
appeal alone (std. b = .020, p = .270, 95% CI = [-2.31, 4.42], Mann-Whitney U p = .298), 
the emotional appeal alone (std. b = -.015, p = .324, 95% CI = [-4.14, 2.57], Mann-
Whitney U p = .298), or when collapsing across the single appeals, std. b = .003, p = 
.464, 95% CI = [-1.85, 2.03], Mann-Whitney U p = .499.  The two combined appeal 
conditions also did not significantly differ in terms of donation amount, std. b = -.032, p 
= .160, 95% CI = [-5.14, 1.68], Mann-Whitney U p = .199.  
 
Figure 1. Mean donation amount by appeal condition, error bars represent +/- 1 S.E. 
 
4. Overview of Findings and Concluding Remarks 
 
The results of this study supported our first two hypotheses, which were that (1) a 
rational appeal and (2) an emotional appeal can have a significant positive effect on 
charitable giving behavior.  Notably, the effects of the philosophical argument and the 
emotional appeal on donations did not differ significantly.  Our hypotheses that (3) a 
combined appeal would be more effective than either appeal alone and that (4) an 
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emotional-first combined appeal would do better than a rational-first combined appeal 
were not supported.  In fact, the rational-first combined appeal performed the best of the 
four appeals, though not significantly better than the others. 
In highlighting the effects of the rational and emotional appeals, as compared to 
the no-appeal control condition, one might object that these results are simply due to 
“experimenter demand.”  However, taken in context, this is not a deflationary alternative 
explanation.  Requests for charitable donations are intended as “demands”—not in the 
sense of being insistent or impolite, but as explicit requests for a specific behavioral 
response.  Given that the requested behavior involves a costly risk, responding positively 
to the request is not trivial, as it might be in other contexts.  The challenge for the present 
research program, then, is not to avoid making “demands” of our participants, but rather 
to determine which kinds of “demands” are effective, in both relative and absolute terms. 
It is also worth noting that the inclusion of a philosophical argument in the 
combined appeals did not significantly dampen the effect of the emotional appeal.  The 
rational-first combined appeal performed slightly better than the emotional appeal alone, 
and the emotional-first combined appeal performed slightly worse than the emotional 
appeal, but again, these differences were not statistically significant.  By contrast, Small, 
Loewenstein, and Slovic (2007) found that the addition of  information on the number of 
people in need to an emotional appeal significantly suppressed donations.  This 
observation, along with the significant effect of the philosophical argument in the rational 
appeal condition, suggests that it may be worth examining differences within the broad 
and loosely-defined category of rational appeals. 
We wish to acknowledge that our distinction between “rational” and “emotional” 
appeals is a rough one and that all effective appeals are likely—if not guaranteed—to 
have both rational and emotional aspects.  Hume (1739/1975) argued long ago that the 
apparent distinction between “reason” and “passion” is better understood as a distinction 
between “calm” and “violent” passions.  Likewise, the distinction between emotion and 
reason is a perennial target of (legitimate) criticism among psychologists (e.g., 
Cunningham et al. 2007; Van Bavel, Xiao, & Cunningham 2012; Cushman, 2013; 
Phelps, Lempert, & Sokol-Hessner 2014).  Consistent with this, we note that participants 
reported being significantly more upset by what they read in the rational appeal 
condition, as compared to the control condition.  Thus, for present purposes, we regard 
“rational” and “emotional” as convenient labels for familiar styles of persuasion, 
reflecting degrees of difference along multiple psychological dimensions.  We do not 
take them to refer to sharply defined and wholly distinct sets of psychological processes. 
Further research will be required to dissociate the relevant underlying processes and their 
respective contributions. 
 Our results do, however, cast doubt on the standard view that appeals that are 
rational in this familiar sense are invariably less effective than conventionally emotional 
appeals in garnering charitable donations.  A philosophical argument, we found, can be as 
effective as an emotional appeal of the kind that has led many to adopt the standard view.  
Of course, this is not to say that philosophical arguments will be effective in general, and 
again, when they do have motivational force this may be partially or entirely due to their 
affective influence.  But some arguments, it is reasonable to think on the basis of our 
results, may be able to convince people to donate more, and so perhaps there is a role for 
rational appeals in motivating prosocial behavior after all.  This work complements 
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recent work showing that Rawlsian veil-of-ignorance reasoning can influence moral 
judgment, including decisions to donate to more effective causes (Huang, Greene, & 
Bazerman, 2019). 
 There may be additional benefits to studying the impact of arguments as opposed 
to emotional appeals that we haven’t been able to explore in this paper.  Emotional 
appeals would seem to work primarily on people’s immediate emotional affect, which is 
subject to depletion based on repeated exposure and over time.  Ethical arguments, 
however, often aim to convince people to change their way of thinking about their own 
behavior and how they should treat other beings, human and non-human.  When 
arguments succeed in changing people’s thinking, they may lead to longer term changes 
in behavior – more sustained giving, changes to diet and food choices, lowering one’s 
carbon emissions, and so on.  This is consistent with the prior points recognizing that 
affect may play an important role in the motivational force of ethical arguments.  Further 
research must be conducted to examine the long-term effects of exposure to arguments on 
behavior and the relation of these effects to the arousal of affect, but our study provides 
evidence that, at least in the short term, a philosophical argument can have a significant 
effect in motivating prosocial behavior. 
 While some philosophers have thought that the study of morality is no different 
from inquiry into any other topic, others have held that moral and political concepts 
should be fruitful in helping us to solve problems that we face as agents interacting with 
other agents and non-agent sentient creatures (see Lindauer forthcoming).  Our work 
demonstrates that thinking about charitable giving in terms of duties of assistance, a 
positive duty, has the virtue of motivating moral action and so meets this desideratum.  
Insofar as the shallow pond argument motivates moral behavior, it is practically fruitful 
in a way that other arguments may not be, and this, according to some philosophers, 
should go into the evaluation of the argument, in addition to its validity and soundness.  
Other approaches may also be examined, such as comparing positive duty arguments 
with arguments that focus on negative duties or duties not to harm (see Buckland et al. 
ms).  While many philosophers have been committed, often implicitly, to the practical 
effects of their ideas and arguments mattering for their evaluation, we take a step further 
here and attempt to directly test the effectiveness of a particular argument.  We look 
forward to seeing more research conducted on the practical effects of philosophical 
arguments, including arguments that focus on other pressing moral problems, such as 
climate change and the plight of refugees. 
Despite the restrictions in the scope of our study discussed above, our findings 
provide insight into the factors that motivate people to address global poverty and 
perhaps other pressing moral issues.  They will also help us to understand the range of 
possible forms of moral motivation, promoting a more nuanced account of the role of 
reason and emotion in prosocial behavior.   
Finally, we hope that this line of research can inform the work of NGOs.  As 
noted above, prior research has suggested that rational appeals will generally suppress the 
positive effects of emotional appeals, but this wasn’t the case in our study.  If, as our 
results suggest, philosophical arguments have some motivating force of their own and 
need not undermine more conventionally emotional appeals, it may be wise to employ 
both types of persuasion, deploying them at different times, with different audiences, and 
with different types of goals.  As the history of these ideas suggests (Singer, 1972, 2015), 
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rational appeals may prove especially effective in producing long-term changes in values, 
attitudes, and behaviors regarding pressing moral problems. 
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Appendix A 
 
The following appeals were used in our study.   
 
Rational Appeal 
 
Please read the following appeal: 
 
As you know, there are many children who live in conditions of severe poverty. As a 
result, their health, mental development, and even their lives are at risk from lack of safe 
water, basic health care, and healthy food. These children suffer from malnutrition, 
unsanitary living conditions, and are susceptible to a variety of diseases such as malaria, 
dysentery, and cholera. Fortunately, effective aid agencies know how to handle these 
problems, but their resources are limited. 
 
Almost all of us think that we should save the life of a child in front of us who is at risk 
of dying (for example, a child drowning in a shallow pond) if we are able to do so. Most 
people also agree that all lives are of equal moral worth. The lives of faraway children are 
no less morally significant than the lives of children close to us, but nearby children exert 
a more powerful emotional influence. Why? 
Scientists have a plausible answer: We evolved in small groups in which people helped 
their neighbors and were suspicious of outsiders, who were often hostile. Today we still 
have these “Us versus Them” biases, even when outsiders pose no threat to us and could 
benefit enormously from our help. Our biological history may predispose us to ignore the 
suffering of faraway people, but we don’t have to act that way. 
  
By taking money that we would otherwise spend on needless luxuries and donating it to 
an effective aid agency, we can have a big impact. We can provide safe water, basic 
health care, and healthy food to children living in severe poverty, saving lives and 
relieving suffering 
 
Shouldn’t we, then, use at least some of our extra money to help children in severe 
poverty? By doing so, we can help these children to realize their potential for a full life. 
Great progress has been made in recent years in addressing the problem of global 
poverty, but the problem isn’t being solved fast enough. Through charitable giving, you 
can contribute towards more rapid progress in overcoming severe poverty.  
 
 
Emotional Appeal 
 
Please read the following appeal: 
 
As you know, there are many children who live in conditions of severe poverty. As a 
result, their health, mental development, and even their lives are at risk from lack of safe 
water, basic health care, and healthy food. These children suffer from malnutrition, 
unsanitary living conditions, and are susceptible to a variety of diseases such as malaria, 
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dysentery, and cholera. Fortunately, effective aid agencies know how to handle these 
problems, but their resources are limited.  
 
This is Aisha. Aisha lives in Chad, and is one of the children who was helped by 
charitable donations that were sent to an effective aid organization working on global 
poverty. Great progress has been made in recent years in addressing the problem of 
global poverty, but the problem isn’t being solved fast enough. Through charitable 
giving, you can contribute towards more rapid progress that will mean children like Aisha 
do not have to live in severe poverty. 
 
Donation Prompt 
You will be paid the amount specified earlier for participating in this study. However, 
you will also be entered in a drawing for a chance of winning an additional $100.  
We offer you the opportunity, should you receive the additional $100, to donate some of 
this money to an organization that works effectively to address the poverty-related 
problems of children in developing countries. You can use the box below to choose the 
amount that you are willing to commit to giving, if you are selected to receive the $100. 
Select 0 if you do not wish to donate anything, or 100 if you wish to donate all your 
winnings, or any number in between to indicate how much you wish to donate. We will 
pay you the remaining part of the bonus and will donate the amount you chose to one of 
the top organizations working on global poverty as rated by GiveWell 
(http://www.givewell.org). GiveWell is an independent organization that carries out 
research to find the organizations that do the most good per dollar received, according to 
a number of strict, testable criteria.  
 
 
 
